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Illegal Billboards: Why the General Assembly Should Revise
the Outdoor Advertising Control Act to Comply with North
Carolina Easement Law
I think that I shall never see
A billboard lovely as a tree.
Indeed, unless the billboards fall,
I'll never see a tree at all.
-Song of the Open Road by Ogden Nash
In August 1999, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted
temporary legislation to quell the flurry of billboard construction
along North Carolina highways.' The law imposed a one-year
moratorium on permits issued for new construction of outdoor
advertising on Interstate Highway 40 from the Orange-Alamance
county line to the Wilmington city limits.2  Pressured by former
Governor Jim Hunt, the legislature extended the moratorium an
additional year during the following session?
1. Act of Aug. 10, 1999, ch. 436, § 1, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 1771, 1771-72; see also
Scenic America, Fight Billboard Blight: Billboards by the Numbers (2000) (finding that
the $1.8 billion outdoor advertising industry controls over 500,000 billboards across the
country and is expanding at a rate of 5,000 to 15,000 per year), at
http:llwv.scenic.orglfactl2.htm (last accessed May 7, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Brian Feagans, Billboard Moratorium Set to End, MORNING STAR
(Wilmington, N.C.), June 28, 2001, at IA ("The ban came after a flurry of advertising
popped up along the 155-mile stretch of interstate between Durham and Wilmington.
More than a third of the segment's 98 billboards were permitted in 1998 and 1999.").
2. 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1771-72. The legislature also directed the Joint
Legislative Transportation Oversight Committee to study whether this ban on
construction should be extended permanently and the Department of Transportation's
policy of allowing billboard owners to enter the state's property to destroy vegetation
obscuring their advertising. Id. The North Carolina General Statutes define "Outdoor
Advertising" as
any outdoor sign, display, light, device, figure, painting, drawing, message,
plaque, poster, billboard, or any other thing which is designed, intended or used
to advertise or inform, any part of the advertising or information contents of
which is visible from any place on the main-traveled way of the interstate or
primary system, whether the same be permanent or portable installation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-128(3) (2001).
3. Act of July 11, 2000, ch. -, § 2, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws ... available at
http:llwv.ncleg.netlSessionLaws/200O_/sl2OOOOlOlldefault.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); see also Feagans, supra note 1, at IA (stating that the General
Assembly extended the 1999 moratorium in 2000 after some "arm twisting" by former
governor Jim Hunt, which caused thirteen legislators to change their vote); Gary D.
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The moratorium issue resurfaced during the 2001 session when
the Senate passed a bill that would have made the ban permanent and
increased the ban's coverage from Wilmington to the Tennessee
border.4 The proposed legislation stalled in the House Committee on
Environmental and Natural Resources and expired at the end of the
2001 session without reaching the floor for a vote.5 The legislature
will likely confront this unresolved issue again in the 2002 session.6
The time has come for the General Assembly to abandon the
current regulatory structure that is based on an ineffective federal
mandate. The legislature should not only extend the ban on new
billboard construction permanently, but should redraft the
regulations so that removal efforts are more effective, with the
ultimate goal of eliminating all nonconforming billboards along North
Carolina's highways. The General Assembly should repeal the
Outdoor Advertising Control Act and codify state easement law as it
pertains to outdoor advertising. This legislative action would allow
the state, without running afoul of state or federal statutory and
constitutional requirements, to prevent new sign construction and
remove existing signs without compensating owners.
This Comment addresses outdoor advertising regulation and
proposes a method for the State of North Carolina to regulate
billboards using North Carolina easement law while, at the same time,
adhering to the requirements of federal law. This Comment first
presents a brief overview of the current federal and state statutory
law governing outdoor advertising regulation. It then discusses North
Carolina easement law and finds that the easement appurtenant
"right to be seen" of the sign by the traveling public governs billboard
regulations. Finally, this Comment challenges the North Carolina
Robertson, 1-40 Future Up In the Air as Billboard Ban Expires: Advocates Want to Make
Moratorium Permanent, But Group of Pro-business Lawmakers Wants to Kill It, THE
HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), June 29, 2001, at B8 (noting then Governor Jim Hunt's
involvement in changing the minds of several House members).
4. See S. 1098, 2001 Gen. Assem., 2001 Session (N.C. 2001); Eric Dyer, Senate
Endorsed Billboard Ban, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), Aug. 26, 2001, at B1;
Feagans, supra note 1, at 1A.
5. See Robertson, supra note 3, at B8 (discussing the expiration of the moratorium
on billboard construction along highway 40); Record Legislation Session, Back in May,
THE HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Dec. 9,2001, at A10 (discussing the conclusion of the
North Carolina legislature's eleven-month session).
6. In fact, the legislation is eligible for consideration in the 2002 Short Session. See
Memorandum from Dianna W. Jessup, Staff Attorney, Research Division, on Bills
Eligible for Consideration by the General Assembly During the 2002 Regular Session of
the 2001 General Assembly (the "Short Session") 1, B-8 (May 8, 2002), at
http://www.ncleg.netlncgadocumentsleligiblebillslbillseligiblefo/default.htm (last accessed
on Aug. 3, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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General Assembly to abandon the existing statutory scheme7 and
codify state easement law as the means to control outdoor
advertising.' It also addresses and dismisses possible constitutional
and statutory challenges to the proposed legislation. This Comment
concludes by finding the abutting landowner's "right to be seen" as an
easement appurtenant. Thus, billboard regulation is governed by
principles of property law, which allow North Carolina to remove
nonconforming outdoor advertising without compensating the owner
of the sign or the land upon which it sits.
Protecting the aesthetics of the land surrounding our nation's
highways has long been of interest to policymakers. Concerns over
environmental and aesthetic impacts of the highway on the
surrounding land motivated the federal government's initial attempts
at highway beautification. 10 The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958,"
7. See ALLETrA BELIN ET AL., A LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR BILLBOARD CONTROL
22 (1976) (arguing that lobbying efforts of the outdoor advertising industry strongly
influenced the existing statutory scheme).
8. This Comment takes the position that removal of outdoor advertising along North
Carolina's highways is a desirable goal. Although this Comment does not discuss the
arguments for and against billboard regulation, it is interesting to note some of the main
arguments presented by both sides. Proponents of regulation generally favor removal of
billboards for aesthetic and environmental reasons. See, e.g., Enough Billboards Along
Our Highways, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), June 29, 2001, at 10A (favoring "a
more scenic and pleasant drive" to letting the "parasites" continue to build signs that
"litter" the land); Robertson, supra note 3, at B8 ("The Sierra Club and other
conservation groups ... say [I-40's] 700 billboards are ugly and mar the state's natural
beauty."). The powerful advertising industry combats this claim by stating that "aesthetics
are subjective", BARRY D. TEATER, BILLBOARD REGULATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 12
(1984) (quoting lobbyist Betty Mann who is vice president for corporate development and
legal counsel at the Raleigh-Durham Division of Naegele Outdoor Advertising
Companies), and "[i]f you want to see beauty and scenery and stuff, you get off the main
roads." Id. at 13 (quoting R.O. Givens of R.O Givens Advertising Co.). Critics of laws
banning billboards also cite the utility in providing tourists with information and
businesses with a cheap form of advertising. Id. at 14. A 1997 study found that over
seventy-six percent of the respondents viewed billboards as useful and that ninety percent
of travelers rely on the signs to find gas, food, lodging, and attractions. Tony Adams,
Billboards Help Out Travelers, MORNING STAR, July 20, 2001, at 9A. Further, critics
refute the arguments that billboards are hazardous to the safety of the traveling public or
to the environment. TEATER, supra, at 16-18.
9. See, e.g., Ruth I. Wilson, Billboards and the Right to be Seen from the Highway, 30
GEO. L. J 723, 724-29 (1942) (discussing billboard regulation under property law as
analyzed by Perlmutter v. Greene, 182 N.E. 5 (N.Y. 1932)).
10. Craig J. Albert, Your Ad Goes Here: How the Highway Beautification Act of 1965
Thwarts Highway Beautification, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 468-77 (2000); BELIN, supra
note 7, at 19. Congress's first action was the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1938, which
allowed for the landscaping of the highway and development of roadside business. BELIN,
supra note 7, at 19. For a more extensive history of federal billboard regulation, see
generally Albert, supra, at 462, which discusses the current state of the Highway
Beautification Act and uses its history to explore Congress's limits under the Spending
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and later, the Highway Beautification Act of 196512 represent
Congress's first attempts to control outdoor advertising by
encouraging state regulation. 3 These Acts set guidelines for the
states to follow in drafting their own regulations and provide
incentives to regulate pursuant to these guidelines. 4 Although widely
criticized,15 the Highway Beautification Act provides the foundation
for all state statutory schemes regulating outdoor advertising. 6
The federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965 was a product of
President Johnson's Great Society initiatives. 7 The purpose of the
Highway Beautification Act was "to protect the public investment in
... highways, to promote the safety and recreational value of public
travel, and to preserve natural beauty."18 The Act levies a ten percent
penalty on federal highway funds against states that fail to make
provisions for "effective control" of outdoor advertising.19 "Effective
Clause. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, much has been written about the
validity of regulation premised on aesthetic values. See, e.g., Mark Bobrowski, Scenic
Landscape Protection Under the Police Power, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 697, 746
(1995) ("Judicial tolerance of aesthetic goals standing alone creates an atmosphere in
which the visual resource, and the role it plays in shaping the community, is freely
explored."); Harold L. Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise of
the Aesthetic State Interest, the Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 439, 442 (1986)
("Indeed, an absolute ban on all public issue billboards or signs for aesthetic or traffic
reasons would be no more justifiable than an absolute ban on leafleting to prevent littering
.... "); Stephanie L. Bunting, Note, Unsightly Politics: Aesthetics, Sign Ordinances, and
Homeowners' Speech in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 473, 474
(1996) ("Despite this support for aesthetic regulation, land use laws are not immune to
constitutional challenges, and aesthetic zoning in particular presents significant First
Amendment concerns.").
11. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-767,76 Stat. 902 (1958).
12. Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-285,79 Stat. 1028 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
13. BELIN, supra note 7, at 19.
14. Id. The Federal-Aid Highway Act provided an incentive, or bonus, to states that
chose to regulate. Id. Congress abandoned this scheme in the Highway Beautification
Act, choosing instead to impose a penalty on states that fail to regulate. Id. The Highway
Beautification Act exclusively controls federal regulation of outdoor advertising. Id. at 24.
15. See, e.g., Albert, supra note 10, at 464 (criticizing the Act as leaving "behind an
unfunded program of billboard removal, together with a financial penalty to be levied on
states that might decide to use their police power to amortize billboards out of existence").
See generally CHARLES F. FLOYD & PETER J. SHEDD, HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT'S GREATEST FAILURE (Westview Replica Ed., 1979)
(discussing the issues surrounding the adoption of the Highway Beautification Act and
why it failed to fulfill its purpose).
16. See BELIN, supra note 7, at 24 (examining the federal foundations of regulating
billboard advertising along highways).
17. Id. at 19; Albert, supra note 10, at 463.
18. 23 U.S.C. § 131(a) (2000).
19. § 131(b); see also § 104 (providing for the apportionment of highway funds to
states).
2002] ILLEGAL BILLBOARDS 2071
control" means restricting all advertising within 660 feet of the
highway, and in rural areas this restriction is extended beyond 660
feet for signs visible from the highway and erected for the purpose of
being seen from the highway.' The definition of "effective control"
provides for only a few exceptions.2 1 Directional and official signs,
such as those marking natural, scenic, and historic attractions, are
exempt as long as they comport with national standards on size,
number, spacing, and lighting.' Furthermore, signs can be used for
the sale or lease of the land upon which the sign stands and to
advertise activities conducted on the land.3 Unless the sign falls into
one of these or one of the other minor exceptions,24 "effective
control" requires their removal to avoid the ten percent penalty on
highway funds."
The most controversial aspect of the Highway Beautification Act
is the just compensation requirement.26 The Act expressly mandates
that the federal and state governments pay the owner just
compensation upon removal of signs that were lawfully erected, but
20. § 131(c).
21. Id.
22. § 131(c)(1).
23. § 131(c)(2)-(3). As discussed further below, the origin of this exemption has its
roots in the public policy considerations relating to easement law and land use generally.
See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
24. See § 131(c)(4)-(5), (d), (f), & (o) (exempting landmark signs, "free coffee" signs,
signs of customary use, signs providing specific information in the interest of the traveling
public, and where removal would cause substantial economic hardship in an area). As
might be expected, the legislation targets rural areas. Section 131(d), for example,
exempts from these provisions signs in zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial areas.
According to Congressional hearings, this would have meant that approximately seventy-
one percent of off-premises signs would have to be removed in rural areas. BELIN, supra
note 7, at 35 n.11. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, it is interesting to note
that this exemption could hinder many of the cities across the country, including those in
North Carolina, such as Durham, from making significant efforts to revitalize their inner
cities. See, e.g., Mark Binker, Council Looks at Vibrant Oklahoma City; The Privately
Funded Trip Appears Geared Towards Selling Members on That City's Aggressive
Approach to Redevelopment, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), July 30, 2002, at BI
(discussing trip where six city council members flew to Oklahoma City and other cities to
study economic development plans); Ronnie Glassberg, Barnes Recovery Awaited,
Longtime Residents Anxious for Neighborhood to Regain Charm That it Held in Decades
Past, THE HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Feb. 17,2002, at Al (discussing Barnes Avenue
project estimated to cost between $8.5 and $10.4 million); Chris Serres, Local Media Giant
Expanding Its Reach, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 2, 2002, at D1
(noting Capital Broadcasting's assistance in redevelopment in Durham since it built the
baseball stadium in 1995).
25. § 131(b)-(c).
26. See BELIN, supra note 7, at 21 ("Predictably, the provision in subsection (g)
requiring 'just compensation' upon removal of certain signs has elicited the most
vehement criticism of the law.").
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which the Act makes unlawful.27 Under the statute, the federal
government is obligated to pay seventy-five percent of such
compensation, and the state is responsible for the remaining twenty-
five percent.2 The lack of federal funds available to pay the billboard
owners, however, has been the biggest obstacle to the implementation
of this Act.29 Because the federal government has not reimbursed
states for the federal government's share, states have been hesitant to
remove nonconforming signs for fear of having to pay the entire cost
of just compensation.30 The states stand to lose federal funding if they
do not comply, however, as the Act provides the framework that state
regulation must follow to avoid the ten percent loss of highway funds,
and requires that states take measures for "effective control" and pay
just compensation for the removal of lawfully erected signs.31
In 1967, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the
Outdoor Advertising Control Act (OACA) to comply with a
Congressional mandate, enforced through the strong arm of the
Spending Clause.32 Drafted to comply with the federal act, OACA
regulation parallels the provisions for effective control detailed in the
Highway Beautification Act.33 The OACA contains the same
prohibition of signs within 660 feet of the highway's right-of-way, with
exceptions for directional and official signs, as well as signs
advertising on-premises activities.34 Like the federal statute,35 it
extends the restrictions beyond 660 feet in rural areas. 6 To enforce
the provisions of the OACA, the legislature vested power in the
27. § 131(g).
28. Id.
29. See BELIN, supra note 7, at 21-23 (arguing that the "just compensation"
requirement has made removal of billboards impossible); Albert, supra note 10, at 502-06
(discussing the inadequate funding of the billboard removal program).
30. See KATHERINE E. SLAUGHTER, A ROAD WITH A VIEW: A LEGAL HANDBOOK
ON BILLBOARD REGULATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 24 (Southern Environmental Law
Center 1989) (finding that Congress has not appropriated funds to pay the federal share of
compensation since 1981).
31. See infra notes 146-76 and accompanying text.
32. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 30, at 23 (finding that North Carolina drafted the
legislation and signed the Federal-State Agreement in January of 1973 to carry out the
intent of the federal Highway Beautification Act); see also Outdoor Advertising Control
Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 136-126 to 136-140.1 (2001).
33. SLAUGHTER, supra note 30, at 27 ("Because the North Carolina Outdoor
Advertising Control Act tracks the federal law, it is flawed in the same ways as the
Highway Beautification Act.").
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-129 (2001).
35. 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (2000).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-129.1 (2001).
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Department of Transportation to issue permits and regulate signs in
compliance with the law. 7
Although drafted to comply with the federal mandate and
combat the proliferation of billboards on North Carolina highways,
the effects of OACA have been sparse, especially since Congress cut
federal funding in 1981.8 Congress's decision to cut funding, and the
states' resultant hesitation to regulate in compliance with the HBA,
undercuts the effectiveness of the HBA. Thus, the current
regulations are not fulfilling OACA's stated purpose to promote safe
highways and preserve and enhance the natural beauty for travelers.
3 9
The General Assembly should abandon the current regulatory
structure that is based on an ineffective federal mandate. It should
permanently ban new billboard construction and redraft current
regulations regarding existing structures to make removal efforts
more effective so that the ultimate goal of eliminating billboards
along North Carolina highways can be attained. North Carolina can
justify removal of such signs based on the principles of property law,
specifically the law of easements.
Although federal law attempts to control highway beautification,
state property law controls the acquisition of property upon which the
highways are built and, as a result, the regulation of advertising
thereon. Congress authorized the creation of an interstate highway
system to support commerce and for use in national and civil
defense.4° It delegated the task of implementing the system, however,
to the individual states, and state law controls the acquisition of real
property needed to build interstate highways.4'
Because state laws govern the acquisition of property used to
build interstate highways, 42 it is necessary to examine North Carolina
37. § 136-130.
38. See TEATER, supra note 8, at 26 ("With no more federal money on its way here,
[North Carolina] discontinued its billboard removal program soon after the federal
funding was cut back."); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
39. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-127 (2001).
40. 23 U.S.C. § 101(b) (2000).
41. 23 C.F.R. 710.203(b)(1) (2001); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-89.50 (2001)
(giving North Carolina Department of Transportation the power to acquire land for
Federal Aid Primary System); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 209 F. Supp. 483,
484 (1962) (noting that participating states have the "responsibility ... for the routing,
planning, right-of-way acquisition and construction of the interstate highways, subject to
the prior approval of the Secretary of Commerce of routes, plans and construction
projects").
42. North Carolina's powers of eminent domain for purposes of building roads are
codified in section 136-19 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. Section 136 grants
the North Carolina Department of Transportation the power to "designate, establish,
2002] 2073
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property law to determine the extent to which the state can regulate
the implementation of the federal highway program. Whichever
method the state uses to acquire the land, North Carolina courts have
determined that the state's interest is so enduring that it constitutes a
fee simple interest in the property.43 Even when the state acquires a
fee simple interest in land for purposes of building a highway, the
state only acquires the land immediately adjoining the highway for
purposes of upkeep. Billboards are built on the land of the abutting
landowner, not the state's land. The value of a billboard depends on
the ability of the traveling public to view its contents. The advertiser,
therefore, uses the sign's proximity to the public road to attract
travelers. As will be explored infra, the "right to be seen" is in the
nature of an appurtenant easement owing its existence merely to the
fact that the land abuts the highway. The right to be seen, however, is
limited in scope. Due to the limitations on this right, billboard use is
limited by property law. The easement appurtenant nature of the
"right to be seen" should be the impetus for revising North Carolina's
billboard regulation.
Because the state acquires a fee simple interest in the property
upon which the highway is built, North Carolina easement law
governs the abutting landowner's right to use the highway.' An
easement is a "nonrevocable right to use or enjoy land of another
person for a special purpose not inconsistent with a general property
right in the [land's] owner."4 5 The easement right is nonpossessory
and limited in purpose.'
abandon, improve, construct, maintain and regulate controlled-access facilities as a part of
the State highway system, National System of Interstate Highways, and Federal Aid
Primary System ... ." § 136-89.50. The state acquires land to build interstate highways
through purchase agreements, donations from landowners, dedication, prescription, or
condemnation. Hughes v. N.C. State Highway Comm'n, 2 N.C. App. 1, 6, 162 S.E.2d 661,
664, rev'd on other grounds, 275 N.C. 121,165 S.E.2d 661,664 (1968).
43. See N.C. State Highway and Public Works Comm'n v. Black, 239 N.C. 198, 202-
03, 79 S.E.2d 778, 782 (1954) (finding that the state acquires the land for highway purposes
completely and indefinitely and "the difference between an easement of this nature and
extent and a fee simple estate in the land covered by the right of way is negligible");
Statesville v. Bowles, 6 N.C. App. 124, 129, 169 S.E.2d 467, 470 (1969) (holding a jury
instruction valid because the easement taken by the state was for all practical purposes a
fee simple because the state has "the complete and perpetual right to occupy and use the
land to the total exclusion of the owner of the fee"); see also Duke Power Co. v. Rogers,
271 N.C. 318, 321, 156 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1967) (finding error in a jury charge regarding an
easement granted to a power company because it applied the incorrect rule usually
applied in a situation where the state acquires land for highways or railroads where the
"value of the easement is virtually the value of the land it embraces").
44. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
45. 1 JAMES A. WEBSTER JR., WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH
CAROLINA: POSSESSORY ESTATES AND PRESENT INTERESTS IN REAL PROPERTY § 15-1
2074 [Vol. 80
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North Carolina recognizes two types of easements: easements in
gross and easements appurtenant. An easement in gross is an interest
in, or right to use, the land of another that is personal and usually
ends at the easement holder's death.47 In contrast, an easement
appurtenant is attached to the land, passes with the land, and has the
purpose of benefiting the land. s For an easement appurtenant to
exist, there must be two tracts of land-a dominant estate and a
servient estate-owned by two different parties.49  The dominant
estate benefits from the easement rights, and the servient estate is
burdened." As discussed infra, the ability to regulate billboard
advertising with property law analysis derives from the property
rights accompanying easements appurtenant.51  A few qualities of
easements appurtenant prove essential to the analysis of billboard
regulation.
First, the owner of the dominant estate must limit the use of the
easement to that "which is reasonably necessary and convenient and
as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible for the use
contemplated. 5 2  In using the easement as contemplated, the
dominant owner is limited to activities connected with the use and
enjoyment of the dominant estate.5 3 The dominant owner, therefore,
cannot use the easement for purposes unconnected with the dominant
estate.54 This issue arose in Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco
(5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter WEBSTER].
46. Id.
47. Shingleton v. State, 260 N.C. 451,454, 133 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1963). An example of
such an easement would be a landowner granting a friend the right to come upon the land
to fish and hunt.
48. See id.
49. WEBSTER, supra note 45, § 15-3.
50. Id.
51. See infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
52. Keller v. Cochran, 108 N.C. App. 783,784-85,425 S.E.2d 432,434 (1993) (citation
omitted).
53. See Shingleton v. State, 260 N.C. 451, 454, 133 S.E.2d 183, 185-86 (1963) ("An
easement appurtenant is incident to an estate, and inheres in the land, concerns the
premises, [and] pertains to its enjoyment ...."); City of Statesville v. Bowles, 6 N.C. App.
124, 130, 169 S.E.2d 467, 471 (1969) (finding the law well settled that the easement can be
used only for those activities that directly or incidentally advance the purpose for which
the dominant estate was acquired); see also Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., 232
N.C. 589, 594, 61 S.E.2d 700, 703 (1950) (finding the use of a building for tobacco storage
and redrying was a misuse of the easement); Keller, 108 N.C. App. at 784-85, 425 S.E.2d at
434 (citation omitted).
54. For example, if an easement were granted so that the dominant estate could use
water on the servient estate for purposes of irrigating the crops on the dominant estate,
the owner of the dominant estate would not have the right to use the servient estate for
fishing.
2002] 2075
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Company,55 where the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad
Company owned an easement appurtenant to the plaintiff's
property. 6 According to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the
easement was limited to those activities "reasonably necessary for or
convenient to the operation of the railroad," not for tobacco redrying
and storage." North Carolina easement law is clear that the owner of
an easement appurtenant must use the easement rights "as may be
necessary to a reasonable and proper enjoyment of [the holder's]
premises. ' '58
Further, the easement "is limited to the land it was created to
serve and cannot be extended to other land or other landowners
.. . ."9 The easement appurtenant is attached to the dominant estate
and is not a personal interest of the property owner.6° Accordingly,
the easement could not be used to access land adjacent to the
dominant estate, even if owned by the same landowner; the easement
can only benefit the dominant estate.61 In Frost v. Robinson,2 for
example, the defendant jointly owned an easement for a driveway
serving four different lots. 63  The court held that the defendant's
purported transfer of this easement to another neighbor was invalid
because the easement appurtenant was created solely to serve the
initial four lots.6' An easement appurtenant, therefore, cannot be
used by other landowners or other property for purposes
unconnected with the use and enjoyment of the dominant estate.
Finally, because an easement appurtenant is attached to the
dominant estate, it is impossible to transfer the rights of the easement
without also transferring the dominant estate.65 The rights of the
easement exist only if the same person owns the easement and the
dominant estate.66 In Wood v. Woodley,67 the defendant's neighbor
55. 232 N.C. 589, 61 S.E.2d 700 (1950).
56. Id. at 592, 61 S.E.2d at 702.
57. Id. at 592, 61 S.E.2d at 703.
58. Hine v. Blumenthal, 239 N.C. 537,546,80 S.E.2d 458,465 (1954).
59. Frost v. Robinson, 76 N.C. App. 399,400,333 S.E.2d 319,320 (1985).
60. Id.
61. Hales v. Ati. Coast Line R.R. Co., 172 N.C. 104, 107,90 S.E. 11, 12 (1916).
62. 76 N.C. App. 399,333 S.E.2d 319 (1985).
63. Id. at 399, 333 S.E.2d at 320.
64. Id. at 400, 333 S.E.2d at 320.
65. See Skvarla v. Park, 62 N.C. App. 482, 486, 303 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1983) ("An
appurtenant easement is an incorporeal right attached to the land; it is incapable of
existence apart from the dominant estate, and it passes with the transfer of title to the
land.").
66. Yount v. Lowe, 288 N.C. 90,97,215 S.E.2d 563,567 (1975).
67. 160 N.C. 17,75 S.E. 719 (1912).
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attempted to grant the defendant the right to use the defendant's
neighbor's right of way.68 The North Carolina Supreme Court held
the attempted conveyance invalid, as the neighbor "had no power to
convey to [the defendant] either a right of way in gross or a right of
way appurtenant" apart from conveying the entire dominant estate. 9
Thus, under North Carolina property law, an easement appurtenant
"cannot be conveyed separate from the land to which it is
appurtenant. 70
To formulate billboard regulation based on property law, the
property interests of both the state and the outdoor advertiser must
be balanced under North Carolina easement law. The first step under
this approach is to determine the interest that the abutting landowner
and advertising companies have in building and maintaining outdoor
advertising signs. To this end, a well-known adage parallels the
inquiry: If a tree falls in the woods, and no one hears it, does it make
any noise? Similarly, if a billboard is built off a road, so that no one
can see it from the public thoroughfare, does it have any value?
Clearly the resource being exploited by the billboard owner is the
view by the traveling public upon the state's road.71 This interest is an
easement appurtenant, where the property containing the billboard is
the dominant tract and the highway is the servient tract.72
If the value of the billboard lies in its view by the public, it is
important to determine whether there is a "right to be seen" under
North Carolina law. The only case in North Carolina to discuss the
"right to be seen" of billboards from public highways is Adams
Outdoor Advertising v. North Carolina Department of
Transportation.73 On the theory that obstruction of a billboard from
the highway constituted a taking requiring compensation, the
plaintiff, an advertising company, sued the state for planting trees and
vegetation obstructing the view of its billboard.74 In refusing to
recognize a taking based upon the "right to be seen," the North
Carolina Court of Appeals analogized the case at hand to Wofford v.
68. Id. at 18,75 S.E. at 720.
69. Id. at 19,75 S.E. at 720.
70. Frost v. Robinson, 76 N.C. App. 399,400,333 S.E.2d 319,320 (1985).
71. See Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 193 N.E. 799, 808 (Mass.
1935) ("The only real value of a sign or billboard lies in its proximity to the public
thoroughfare within public view.").
72. See McNeill v. N.C. State Highway Comm'n, 4 N.C. App. 354, 359, 167 S.E.2d 58,
61 (1969).
73. 112 N.C. App. 120,434 S.E.2d 666 (1993).
74. Id. at 121,434 S.E.2d at 667.
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North Carolina State Highway Commission,75 which discusses the
abutting landowner's easement interest in accessing the road from his
property.76 The court viewed the "right to be seen" from the state
road as analogous to the "abutting owner's easements of light, air,
and access" to the state road.77 This decision is significant in two
respects: 1) it recognized that the sign owner's property interest at
stake is the view of the billboard by the public traveling on a state
road, and 2) the holding is partly based on easement law concerning
the abutting landowner's interest in state roads.78
Because the interest is in the right to be seen, which involves
easement principles, billboard use depends on property law governing
easements. The opinion in Adams Outdoor Advertising analogizes
the abutting landowner's "right to be seen" to his right of access to
the abutting highway.79 Further analysis suggests that an abutting
landowner's right to be seen by the traveling public is an easement
appurtenant, and therefore its use must comply with North Carolina
easement law. As seen in Wofford, a North Carolina landowner has a
right of access to state roads abutting his property.80 The interest that
creates this right is the easement appurtenant attached to his land at
the burden of the state's road.8 Following the Adams Outdoor
75. 263 N.C. 677, 140 S.E.2d 376 (1965). In Wofford, the plaintiffs sued because a
highway was closed, turning their street into a cul-de-sac, and making it more difficult for
both them and their visitors to get to and from their property. Id. at 679-80, 140 S.E.2d at
378. The court held that this was an incidental interference with their right of access and
not compensable. Id. at 684, 140 S.E.2d at 381.
76. Adams Outdoor Adver., 112 N.C. App. at 124,434 S.E.2d at 668.
77. Id. (quoting Smith v. State Highway Comm'n, 257 N.C. 410,414, 126 S.E.2d 87, 90
(1962)).
78. A number of other jurisdictions recognize the abutter's right to be seen by
travelers upon state roads. See, e.g., Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co., v. Dep't of Pub. Works,
193 N.E. 799, 808 (Mass. 1935) (finding the right to be seen is not a "natural right" but
rather a private seizure of a benefit at the burden of the public); Outdoor Adver. Ass'n. v.
Shaw, 598 S.W.2d 783, 788 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the "State may with
impunity interfere with the view of the motorist to adjacent property so long as the
interference is the result of a bona fide program of highway beautification"); Kelbro, Inc.
v. Myrick, 30 A.2d. 527, 530 (Vt. 1943) ("This right of reasonable view has been generally
recognized by the weight of authority and has been protected in numerous cases where
encroachments on streets or sidewalks obscured the visibility of signs, window displays or
show cases."); see also BELIN, supra note 7, at 11-17; Wilson, supra note 9, at 724-29;
Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Provision Prohibiting or
Regulating Advertising Sign Overhanging Street or Sidewalk, 80 A.L.R.3d 687, § 2(a)
(1977).
79. Adams Outdoor Adver., 112 N.C. App. at 124,434 S.E.2d at 668.
80. See Wofford, 263 N.C. at 681, 140 S.E.2d at 380 (finding that the abutting
landowner has a private right of reasonable access to the abutting highway known as an
easement appurtenant).
81. See S. Furniture Co. of Conover, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 133 N.C. App. 400, 404,
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Advertising analogy to its logical conclusion, the abutting landowner
has a right to be seen that is of the nature of an easement
appurtenant.
Public policy considerations also support the conclusion that the
landowner's right to be seen by the traveling public is based on an
easement appurtenant interest. Abutters' easements are grounded in
the courts' view that "public policy favors the improvement and
development of land adjoining the public highways." 82 These are not
bargained-for rights; rather they are implied by law, similar to rights
for adjacent and subjacent support of land.83 The law implies these
rights because "the beneficial use and enjoyment of the land along
the highway so completely depend upon the owner having these
rights."84 Without giving landowners the opportunity to use the roads
that abut their property, most, if not all, land would be useless
because there would be no means to get from one tract of land to
another without crossing the state's road The same policy
considerations support a right to have the public view the abutting
property so that the public can be properly notified if a doctor,
grocer, dry cleaner, or even a lawyer is on the premises with goods or
services available. The construction of a highway alone risks making
surrounding land worthless without allowing the right of egress. It
also risks destroying businesses that have always used a sign to notify
their customers of the locations of their respective businesses. This
ability to post a sign with a right that it be seen from the road is
necessary for businesses to mark their presence. Certainly, such a
516 S.E.2d 383, 386 (1999) (finding that North Carolina law is "well settled" and the
abutting landowner has a special legal right to access and use the public road); Dep't of
Transp. v. Crain, 89 N.C. App. 223, 226-27, 365 S.E.2d 694, 697 (1988) (holding that the
abutting landowner has a special easement right of access to the public road that the
general public lacks); Emanuelson v. Gibbs, 49 N.C. App. 417, 421, 271 S.E.2d 557, 559
(1980) (finding that the abutting landowner has an easement appurtenant right to access
the public road).
82. Wilson, supra note 9, at 739.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 40.
85. The issue was phrased nicely by Judge Vredenburgh of the New Jersey Court of
Appeals:
When people build upon the public highway, do they inquire or care who owns
the fee of the road-bed? Do they act or rely upon any other consideration
except that it is a public highway, and they the adjacent owners? Is not this a
right of universal exercise and acknowledgment in all times and in all countries,
a right of necessity, without which cities could not have been built, and without
the enforcement of which they would soon become tenantless? It is a right
essential to the very existence of dense communities.... It is a right founded on
such urgent necessity that all laws and legal proceedings take it for granted.
Wilson, supra note 9, at 731 (quoting Barnett v. Johnson, 15 N.J. Eq. 481,487-89 (1863)).
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right to notify the public is necessary for the improvement and
development of land along highways.
To assist North Carolina in developing a system for regulating
billboards, an analysis of other states' regulatory schemes is useful.
The regulatory system in Vermont, for instance, provides an apt
comparison because of its great success in abolishing off-site
advertising86 on its public roads." The Vermont courts have upheld
billboard regulation recognizing that the abutting landowner has a
"right to be seen" interest in the nature of an easement appurtenant s
In Kelbro v. Myrick,89 the plaintiff, an outdoor advertising company,
sought an injunction restraining the State of Vermont from removing
the company's billboards.' The court first determined that "[i]n its
essence the right that [was] claimed [was] to use the public highway
for the purpose of displaying advertising matter."91 The court found
this right to be a private right arising from the ownership of land
abutting a public highway similar to the right of access-regardless of
whether the state or the landowner actually owned the fee in the land
upon which the highway was built.92 These rights are in the nature of
appurtenant easements governed by the law of easements, 93 where
the abutting property is the dominant estate and the highway the
servient estate.94 The court further held that this right did not include
86. A model ordinance proposed by Katherine E. Slaughter of the Southern
Environmental Law Center defines an "Off-site Sign" or "Off-site Advertising" as: "Any
sign that is used to attract attention to an object, person, product, institution, organization,
business, service, event or location that is not located on the premises upon which the sign
is located. This definition does not include governmental traffic, directional, or regulatory
signs or notices of the federal, state, county or city government or their public agencies."
SLAUGHTER, supra note 30, at 31.
87. BELIN, supra note 7, at 15.
88. See Micalite Sign Corp. v. State Highway Dep't, 236 A.2d 680, 681 (Vt. 1967);
Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, 30 A.2d 527, 529-30 (Vt. 1943). As discussed further below, see
infra note 165 and accompanying text, the Vermont legislature drafted billboard
regulation to comply with the federal Highway Beautification Act that severely limited the
utility of the law on the "right to be seen." See Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606, 614
(D. Vt. 1974).
89. 30 A.2d 527 (Vt. 1943).
90. Id. at 528.
91. Id. at 529.
92. Id. ("While the cases involving such [private] rights relate, mainly, to questions of
ingress and egress, light and air, and lateral support, neither logic nor sound legal principle
exclude the recognition of other rights equally valuable to an abutting owner.").
93. The court did not actually decide whether or not the right was an actual interest
but conceded that "whether they are true easements in the strictest sense they are at least
rights in the nature of appurtenant easements .... " Id. at 529-30.
94. Id at 530.
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the right to advertise for a business conducted off-premises. 95
Therefore, there was no right at stake, and the state could remove the
sign.9
The nature of the rights involved, considerations of public policy,
and the persuasive rationale of Vermont's courts compel the
conclusion that billboard advertising in North Carolina should be
controlled by state easement law. Applying this framework, the
abutting property is the dominant tract and the highway is the
servient tract, as it receives certain benefits, such as direct access and
right to be seen.97 The state acquires a fee simple interest in the
property condemned and the completed highway does not require the
use of any surrounding land; therefore the state's land cannot be
considered the dominant tract.98
Because the law of easements governs billboard use, there are
certain limiting principles that apply to such advertising. First,
owners of an easement appurtenant must use the easement rights
only "as may be necessary for the reasonable and proper enjoyment
of their premises." 99 The abutting landowner's right to be seen from
the public road is not unlimited. Further, the easement interest is not
a separable personal interest; rather it is a private interest that must
pertain to the reasonable and proper use of the land."°  This
requirement is exemplified by a landowner who owns a large tract of
land used to harvest timber. If the only use for this land is growing
and cutting trees for harvest, then presumably a billboard could not
advertise for the finished lumber product, even if the same landowner
owns the mill that processes the harvest into lumber.1' The
landowner could, however, advertise the sale of the unfinished
product to the traveling public in the hopes of catching the eye of an
owner of a processing mill or a member of the general public in need
of firewood. In such a scenario, the landowner would be using the
right to be seen for the necessary and reasonable use and enjoyment
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. McNeill v. N.C. State Highway Comm'n, 4 N.C. App. 354, 359, 167 S.E.2d 58, 61
(1969) (finding that the North Carolina Highway Commission is the owner of the servient
estate).
98. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
99. Hine v. Blumenthal, 239 N.C. 537, 546, 80 S.E.2d 458, 465 (1954); see also supra
notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
2002] 2081
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of his property-that is, to make a profit in the sale of the timber
harvested on the land.102
An easement appurtenant cannot be used by other landowners
or for other property for purposes unconnected with the use and
enjoyment of the dominant estate.10 3 Accordingly, the right to be
seen cannot be used for the benefit of other landowners or other land.
Continuing the above timber example, the landowner would not have
the right to construct a billboard that advertised the mill that
purchases the bulk of his timber. For that matter, he could not
advertise for the shopping mall a mile down the road from his
property. Advertising off-site businesses would benefit other
landowners for purposes that are not connected with the use and
enjoyment of his property.
An appurtenant easement "cannot be conveyed separate from
the land to which it is appurtenant."'" 4 This principle is perhaps the
most important in billboard regulation because most outdoor
advertising signs are owned by advertising companies who lease the
land upon which the signs are built. The right to be seen, however,
cannot be conveyed to an advertising company or anyone else who
wishes to advertise on the abutting land. The owner of the land used
for timber harvesting, therefore, could not transfer this right to the
owner of the shopping mall down the street. Only the owner of the
land abutting the public road can assert the right to be seen, for his
own purposes to advertise activities on his land.
Together, these principles make it possible to eliminate virtually
all outdoor advertising in North Carolina. The abutting landowner
can only construct an advertisement that is necessary for the
reasonable use and enjoyment of his land. Such a restriction is
consistent with both federal and state statutes that expressly exempt
outdoor advertising for activities conducted on the premises of the
abutting land.0 5
Pursuant to this interpretation of easement law, the North
Carolina General Assembly should redraft the outdoor advertising
regulations to more effectively control billboards along public
102. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
104. Frost v. Robinson, 76 N.C. App. 399, 400, 333 S.E.2d 319, 320 (1985); see also
supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 131(c) (2000) (defining "effective control" to exempt signs
advertising the sale or lease of the land or activities conducted upon the land); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 136-129 (2001) (exempting signs that advertise the sale or lease of the land,
temporary signs for roadside crop sales, and activities conducted on the property).
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highways. First, the billboard moratorium for new construction
should be extended permanently. Furthermore, the new legislation
should vest in the Department of Transportation the power to
remove nonconforming signs immediately, with no amortization
period or compensation." 6 Ideally, the term "nonconforming sign"
should include all signs, except for official and directional signs, and
signs advertising activities on the land upon which they stand.107 The
legislature could, however, provide for other exceptions as long as it
obeys the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution.108 Finally, the legislation should provide for tight
restrictions regarding the use of conforming signs to minimize their
burden on the public highway.109 Because of the structure of North
Carolina easement law, the legislature can enact such legislation
without violating either the federal or state constitutions, or the
Highway Beautification Act."0
There has been an abundance of litigation concerning whether
the takings clause presents an obstacle to the states' ability to regulate
billboard construction."' The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution provides that "private property [shall not] be
taken for public use ... without just compensation." '  The
Amendment's prohibition applies to the states through the Due
106. See infra notes 111-45 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
108. As pertaining to billboard regulation, conforming to the strictures of the Equal
Protection Clause has not proven to be much of a problem because courts will only look to
see that there is a rational basis for the distinction. See, e.g., A-S-P Assoc. v. Raleigh, 298
N.C. 207,226-28,258 S.E.2d 444, 457-58 (1979) (upholding a local ordinance that forbade
billboards in land designated as a historic district); Schloss v. Jamison 262 N.C. 108, 118,
136 S.E.2d 691, 698 (1964) (quoting Rockingham Hotel Co. v. N. Hampton, 146 A.2d 253,
255 (N.H. 1958)) (concluding that separately classifying signs advertising businesses
conducted upon the premises where the signs are located as a permitted use is a
reasonable classification not depriving the plaintiff of equal protection); Summey Outdoor
Adver., Inc. v. County of Henderson, 96 N.C. App. 533, 540, 386 S.E.2d 439, 444 (1989)
("Based upon the foregoing [equal protection analysis], we find that the off-premise/on-
premise classification is a constitutionally valid basis for regulation of outdoor advertising
signs."); County of Cumberland v. E. Fed. Corp., 48 N.C. App. 518, 525-26, 269 S.E.2d
672,677 (1980) (holding that billboard restrictions based on commercial zoning ordinances
are not unreasonable and therefore do not deny equal protection of the law).
109. See Keller v. Cochran, 108 N.C. App. 783,784-85,425 S.E.2d 432,434 (1993).
110. See infra notes 111-76 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1993); Ga.
Outdoor Adver. Inc. v. Waynesville, 900 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1990); Naegele Outdoor
Adver. v. Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 173, 178 (4th Cir. 1988); Major Media of the Southeast,
Inc. v. Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1273, 1274 (4th Cir. 1986).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.113 The central issue is
whether the state regulation constitutes a "taking" for public use.
The United States Supreme Court recognizes two broad types of
takings: possessory taking, where there is an actual physical
interference with the property,114 and regulatory taking, where the
government action leaves no economic use of the property.1 5
Billboard regulation qualifies as a regulatory taking.1 6 Under this
construction courts will find a regulatory taking if the legislation
"does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, ... or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land.""17  In
determining the economic viability of the land, it is essential to first
consider the interest that the government interfered with in the first
place.
Identifying the interest at stake was key to the holding of a
leading federal regulatory takings case, Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City
of Mesa."8 In that case, the plaintiff advertising company leased small
tracts of land, constructed billboards on the land, and leased the
advertising space." 9  The city enacted a municipal code that
conditioned building permits on the removal, without compensation,
of all nonconforming' 2° billboards on the land where construction was
to be commenced.121 The advertising company claimed that this code
effected an "impermissible taking of property."'" The court
recognized two different property interests involved-the
landowner's and the billboard owner's-and proceeded to consider
them separately) 3 The court found that the landowner would
continue to have an "economically viable use" in developing the land
without the billboard and rejected as de minimis the contention that it
would lose the revenue from the billboard lease.2 4 The court held the
113. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 606 (2001) (citing Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).
114. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427
(1982).
115. See, e.g., Penn. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
116. See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Adver., 844 F.2d at 178 (remanding to the district court
to determine whether the ordinance denied the plaintiff "economically viable use" of the
property).
117. Id. at 175-76 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980)).
118. 997 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1993).
119. Id. at 608.
120. Mesa's sign code prohibited all commercial off-site signs. Id.
121. Id. at 609.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 617.
124. Id.
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municipal government's act "insufficient to constitute a taking where
the land may still be put to an economically viable use."' In
analyzing the billboard owner's interest, the court found it necessary
to "look to state law to determine 'what property rights exist and who
is entitled to recover for a taking.' ",126 The court found that under
Arizona law, the advertising company did not have a vested property
right to continue the use of a nonconforming sign, and, therefore,
there was no taking.27 The court held that the city's code did not
facially violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment."z
In applying the Takings Clause analysis outlined above to the
suggested North Carolina legislation, it is clear that the deprivation of
an easement appurtenant interest does not provide justification for
finding a taking that requires just compensation. Generally, courts
have had no difficulty finding billboard regulation to be a legitimate
state interest; consequently, the analysis usually focuses on whether
the regulation left the property economically useless.129 North
Carolina has a legitimate interest in regulating outdoor advertising.3 °
Therefore, the issue is whether any provision would render either the
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Milens of Cal. v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 665 F.2d 906, 909 (9th
Cir. 1982)).
127. Id. ("As there is no property right under Arizona law to continue a
nonconforming use once that use is altered, it cannot be an unconstitutional taking to
require a nonconforming billboard to be removed once the land on which it stands
changes use.").
128. Id. at 618.
129. See BELIN, supra note 7, at 40 ("Most courts have taken the view that regulation
and removal of billboards is a valid exercise of the police power because it bears a
'reasonable and substantial relation' to health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the
community."); see, e.g., Outdoor Sys., 997 F.2d at 611, 616 (finding that prohibiting
commercial off-site signs "advanced[d] the cities' twin goals of esthetics and safety" and
recognizing that " 'economically viable use' has yet to be defined with much precision");
Ga. Outdoor Adver. Inc. v. Waynesville, 900 F.2d 783,787 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that the
prohibition of all off-premises advertising a proper exercise of police power and "the
crucial inquiry centers on the second prong of the test: whether the ordinance denies
[plaintiff] economically viable use of its property"); Naegele Outdoor Adver. v. Durham,
844 F.2d 172, 174, 177 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that "the location of the billboard in
commercial and industrial areas does not preclude the city from relying on aesthetics to
justify its exercise of police power" but remanding for further factual inquiry because a
"'determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a
determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of
an exercise of state power in the public interest... [that] necessarily requires a weighing
of private and public interests' ") (citation omitted).
130. The state's interest in promoting "the safety, health, welfare and convenience and
enjoyment of travel ... and to promote safety on the highways, to attract tourists and
promote the prosperity, economic well-being and general welfare of the State," N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 136-127 (2001), bears a "'reasonable and substantial relation' to the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare of the community." BELIN, supra note 7, at 40.
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landowner's or billboard owner's interest economically useless. This
conflict necessitates considering the interest at stake.
First, a provision banning construction of new billboards does
not constitute a taking of private property for public use. Despite the
fact that the land would arguably retain an economically viable use,
3
'
the landowner does not have a legitimate private interest in
constructing a billboard. Under the law of easements, the owner of
the easement appurtenant cannot use the right to be seen for a use
unconnected to the land. Therefore, the landowner could not
construct a billboard advertising activities off the premises.
Furthermore, the landowner could not lease this right to be seen to an
advertising company without leasing the land itself." Even still, the
right to be seen could not be used for purposes unconnected with the
land. Because the regulation would not interfere with a vested right,
the landowner would not have a takings claim against a state that
banned the construction of new billboards that advertise activities
unconnected with the land.
Second, a provision permitting the removal of nonconforming
signs does not constitute a taking of private property for public use.
Nonconforming signs, by definition, involve a use that is inconsistent
with the landowner's easement appurtenant interest. 133  Their
removal, therefore, would not involve a taking of a legitimate
property right and thus could not constitute an unconstitutional
taking." 4 The prior use would "have to be classed as an excess use of
the privilege, permitted only by indulgence," while new enforcement
provisions would "merely limit or withdraw a favor .... ,13 5
Finally, a provision restricting conforming signs does not
constitute a taking of private property for public use. The only
caveat, however, is that restrictions on conforming signs to further the
state's interest in safe and beautiful highways cannot go "too far. '11
6
131. As was the case with the defendant landowner in Outdoor Systems, Inc., the land
would still have some economically viable use and the regulation would not eliminate the
"fundamental attribute of ownership." Outdoor Sys., 997 F.2d at 617 (quoting Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,262 (1980)).
132. This leasing situation is rare, because most of these leases are not in fact leases of
the land with a right of possession, but rather a right to use the view. See Wilson, supra
note 9, at 745-46 (stating that the lessee's interest is generally a mere license or, in some
cases, an easement, but these agreements rarely grant the right of possession).
133. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed revisions
that should be considered by the General Assembly).
134. See Outdoor Sys., 997 F.2d at 617.
135. Wilson, supra note 9, at 748.
136. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("[W]hile property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
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Because a conforming sign would involve activities conducted on the
premises, restrictions that are too severe could inhibit the property's
economic use. A takings analysis is an "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquir[y].' 1 37 As such, the determination of a violation necessitates
weighing the following factors on a case-by-case basis: "(1) The
'economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,' (2) the 'extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations,' (3) the 'character of the governmental action.' "138 The
legislature should study the effects of such regulation before
restricting conforming signs.
In addition to complying with the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, the suggested legislation must conform to North
Carolina constitutional requirements. Interestingly, North Carolina is
the only state without an express constitutional requirement of
compensation upon a public taking. Nevertheless, North Carolina
courts have inferred such a requirement.139 The analysis under North
Carolina law parallels that used for the federal constitution. Finch v.
137. Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 174 (4th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988)).
138. Id. at 176 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
139. See Stillings v. City of Winston-Salem, 63 N.C. App. 618, 621 n.1, 306 S.E.2d 489,
492 n.1 (1983), rev'd on other grounds by 311 N.C. 689, 319 S.E.2d 233 (1984). Both
section 17 and section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution have been used to imply this
requirement. See, e.g., Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 362-63, 384 S.E.2d 8, 14
(1989) ("[A]Ithough the North Carolina Constitution does not contain an express
provision prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without payment of just
compensation, this Court has inferred such a provision as a fundamental right integral to
the 'law of the land' clause in article I, section 19 of our Constitution."); In re Annexation
Ordinances, 253 N.C. 637, 651-52, 117 S.E.2d 795, 805 (1961) (holding that "where
additional territory is annexed in accordance with the law, the fact that the property of the
residents in such area will thereby become subject to city taxes levied in the future, does
not constitute a violation" of due process of law under Article I, section 17 of the North
Carolina Constitution); Eason v. Spence, 232 N.C. 579, 583, 61 S.E.2d 717, 721 (1950)
("Under Article I, Section 17, of the State Constitution, no person can be deprived of his
property except by his own consent or the law of the land. The law of the land and due
process of law are interchangeable terms."); Parker v. Stewart, 29 N.C. App. 747, 747-48,
225 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1976) (holding that Article 1, section 19 of the North Carolina
Constitution "provides that no person may be deprived of his property except by the law
of the land or expressed another way, except by due process of law."); see also WEBSTER,
supra note 45, § 19-1 (5th ed. 1999) (stating that North Carolina does not have an express
constitutional provision requiring compensation, but that one is clearly implied). Article
1, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution provides "No person shall be... disseized
of his freehold, ... or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the
law of the land." Article 1, section 17 of the North Carolina Constitution provides:
"Slavery is forever prohibited. Involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the parties have been adjudged guilty, is forever prohibited."
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City of Durham'4° sets out the test that North Carolina courts use to
determine whether the state is required to compensate for a taking.141
Like the federal law, North Carolina uses a two-part test. 42 The first
part is known as the "ends-means" test, which involves a
determination of whether the object of the legislation is within the
scope of the state's police power and whether the means chosen are
reasonable.143  The second part parallels the "economically viable
use" test under federal analysis for determining whether the
regulation "has the effect of completely depriving an owner of the
beneficial use of his property by precluding all practical uses or the
only use to which it is reasonably adapted .... "144 North Carolina
state courts have acknowledged that the federal and state tests are
equivalent. 45 Because the analysis is the same as that under the
United States Constitution, none of these proposed legislative
provisions would violate the North Carolina Constitution. The new
provisions are therefore permissible under both the federal and state
constitutions.
Similarly, the proposed legislative scheme would not contravene
the federal Highway Beautification Act. The Highway Beautification
Act provides for a penalty of ten percent of apportioned federal
highway funds for states that fail to provide for "effective control" of
outdoor advertising.146  This penalty represents a significant sum of
money, and, therefore, the state legislature has a strong interest in
complying with the Act. 47 The crucial determination is the meaning
140. 325 N.C. 352,384 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
141. Id. at 363-64, 384 S.E.2d at 14-15; see also Summey Outdoor Adver., Inc. v.
County of Henderson, 96 N.C. App. 533,541-43,386 S.E.2d 439,444-45 (1989).
142. See Finch, 325 N.C. at 363,384 S.E.2d at 14.
143. Id. Basically, this "ends-means" test is similar to a rational basis analysis.
144. Id. at 363-64,384 S.E.2d at 15.
145. See, e.g., McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552,563,398 S.E.2d 475,481 (1990)
(stating that federal court interpretations of the Due Process Clause in the United States
Constitution are "persuasive," but not controlling, in construing North Carolina's "law of
the land" clauses); Guilford County Dep't of Emergency Servs. v. Seaboard Chem. Corp.,
114 N.C. App. 1, 12, 441 S.E.2d 177, 183 (1994) (finding the federal and state tests
consistent and analyzing state and federal constitutional claims together); State v.
McCleary, 65 N.C. App. 174, 180, 308 S.E.2d 883, 888 (1983) ("The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, together with the Law of the Land Clause
of Article I, [section] 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, provide that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.").
146. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
147. For example, North Carolina's total apportionment in 2001 by the Federal
Highway Administration was $808,207. Federal Highway Administration Highway
Statistics 2000, Table FA-4 (May 2002), available at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/ohimstat.htm (last accessed August 14, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
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of "effective control" and its relation to the just compensation
requirement.
The principle case addressing effective control and the
compensation requirement is Vermont v. Brinegar,14s in which the
court held that "'effective control' ... includes the requirement that
just compensation be paid to those persons affected by the removal of
outdoor advertising signs, and a failure or refusal to pay just
compensation subjects a state to a [ten] percent reduction in its
Federal-aid highway fund allocation."'49 The court conducted an
extensive analysis of the issue, starting with a textual argument based
on the use of the word "section" in 23 U.S.C. § 131(c) in directing the
manner in which signs should be limited under the Act, rather than
"subsection.' 150  According to the court, Congress's choice of the
word "section" expressed its intention that § 131(c) does not alone
define "effective control.' 5' Accordingly, the provisions of
subsection (g) must also be met to provide for "effective control.' ' 52
The court further discussed the legislative history to clarify the
meaning of the text. 53 Relying on Congressional floor debates 54 and
Congress's rejection of a 1972 amendment that would have clarified
the supposed ambiguity and eliminated the mandatory nature of the
compensation provision, the court concluded that legislative history
did not contradict its interpretation of § 131.156 The court further
relied on decisions of the Attorney General' 5 7 and the Secretary of
148. 379 F. Supp. 606 (D. Vt. 1974); see also Nat'l Adver. Co. v. Ashlord, 678 F.2d 106,
108 (1982) (citing Brinegar in holding that a state must provide "effective control" or else
lose ten percent of funds).
149. Id. at 615.
150. Id. at 610; see also 23 U.S.C. § 131(c) ("Effective Control means that such signs,
displays or devices [covered by the Act] ... shall, pursuant to this section, be limited to
[various exemptions].").
151. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. At 610.
152. Id.
153. Id. (noting that the court would consider the legislative history because there was
some doubt as to the meaning intended).
154. Id. at 611 (quoting 111 CONG. REC. 23,874 (1965)) (stating that in the Senate floor
debate over the bill, the sponsor of the Act said a ten percent penalty would be levied
against a state that for any reason failed to pay its share of the compensation
requirement).
155. Id. at 611-12 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 34,150-51(1972)) ("[Tlhe House rejected the
amendment, thus supporting the inference that Congress did not believe the Act to be
ambiguous and that it intended a [ten] percent reduction in Federal highway funds to
result from a failure to pay just compensation to those affected by the removal of outdoor
advertising.").
156. Id. at 612.
157. Id. (discussing a 1966 opinion of the Attorney General concluding that each state
must afford just compensation to avoid the ten percent penalty).
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Transportation,15 both supporting the court's interpretation of the
statutory scheme. Finally, relying on policy considerations, the court
determined that Congress, being generous in the federal share of the
compensation, would not act without establishing a mechanism to
enforce the federal policy of just compensation.1 9 This thorough
discussion ended in the conclusion that Congress intended that states
would forfeit ten percent of the apportioned federal highway funds if
they removed signs that were legally erected without paying just
compensation to the landowner or sign owner. 6°
Even conceding the validity of Brinegar, the North Carolina
General Assembly can empower the Department of Transportation
to remove nonconforming billboards without compensating either the
landowner or the sign owner and without suffering the Highway
Beautification Act's ten percent penalty. The federal act mandates
that "[j]ust compensation ... be paid upon the removal of any
outdoor advertising sign, display, or device lawfully erected under
State law .... ,,161 As was the case in determining whether the
Constitution required payment of just compensation, 62 state law
should determine the applicability of the just compensation
requirement in the federal act. North Carolina, therefore, can
remove any signs that were illegal at the time of their erection.
Because the interest in a billboard that is at stake is in the nature
of an appurtenant easement, any sign that is noncompliant under the
proposed legislation1 63 would also be an illegal sign. The court in
Brinegar, however, came to a contrary conclusion with regard to
Vermont law,"6 which, like North Carolina, is based on easement
appurtenant law.165 Vermont argued that it licensed the billboards
and "that termination of licenses is not compensable and all interests
the signowner has in the signs are possessed by virtue of the licenses
158. Id. at 612-13 ("[W]e believe this case presents an appropriate instance for
granting due respect to the administrative interpretation of this statute by those charged
with administering it.").
159. Id. at 613. Of course this argument could cut the other way, for one could also
argue that the exceedingly generous federal component was the vehicle Congress chose to
enforce the stated federal policy.
160. Id. at 615.
161. 23 U.S.C. § 131(g) (2000) (emphasis added).
162. See supra notes 111-28 and accompanying text.
163. Again, the term "nonconforming sign" would include all signs except for official
and directional signs, and signs advertising activities on the land upon which they stand.
Any other sign would necessarily exceed the rights inherent in the appurtenant easement.
164. Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606,613-15 (D. Vt. 1974).
165. See supra notes 44-70 and accompanying text.
2090 [Vol. 80
ILLEGAL BILLBOARDS
and not by any substantive right.' 1 66 The court relied on two findings
to refute the state's proposition.67 First, it concluded that the
property law approach to billboard use in Vermont was replaced by
the enactment of Vermont Statutes Annotated Title 10, section
496(a), which was modeled after the Highway Beautification Act and
designed to avoid the forfeiture of federal highway funds. 68 Second,
it found that § 131(g) required that just compensation "be paid for the
taking of all right, title, leasehold and interest in" the sign removed,
and, therefore, "[i]n the case of an owner of the real property upon
which the sign is located, just compensation must be paid for the
taking of the right to erect and maintain such signs."' 69 The court
concluded that Vermont was required to compensate for the removal
of signs lest it lose the federal highway funds.
The principles relied on for the holding in Brinegar are
inapplicable to North Carolina law. First, in North Carolina, the
property interest of the abutting landowner is an easement
appurtenant right to be seen, and this legal right was not altered by
the enactment of the Outdoor Advertising Control Act. The
Declaration of Policy specifically states that "[i]t is the intention of
the General Assembly to provide and declare herein a public policy
and statutory basis for the regulation and control of outdoor
advertising." '' This law does not preempt the common law property
rights relating to the right to be seen, nor create new substantive
rights, but serves as a statement of policy, a statement of how
resources will be allocated in enforcing the easement law relating to
public highways. Certainly the arbitrary choice to regulate signs
within 660 feet is not a decision to alter easement appurtenant rights
within 660 feet, but rather a public policy choice to spend resources to
enforce the state's rights within this perimeter. The fact that the
Act mirrors the Highway Beatification Act supports the inference
that this provision was not intended to change the substantive law,
but rather to enforce, or "effective[ly] control," easement rights to
avoid a federal penalty. The implementation of the Outdoor
Advertising Control Act did not preempt the common law easement
appurtenant rights afforded to the abutting landowner.
166. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. at 613.
167. Id. at 614-15.
168. Id. at 614.
169. Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 615.
171. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-127 (2001).
172. Both the federal act, 23 U.S.C. § 132(c) (2000), and the North Carolina act, section
136-129, regulate signs within 660 feet of the public way.
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Nonconforming signs are thus illegal signs and not subject to the
compensation requirement of § 131(g).
Second, the Brinegar decision incorrectly held that the
landowner's right to erect and maintain billboards was a legitimate
right, which would require compensation for a taking. Under
Vermont law, the landowner did not have a legal right to advertise
activities not conducted on the premises because such advertising
would involve a use in excess of the rights afforded the abutting
landowner.17 3 Consequently, if a legal right does not exist in the first
place, removing such a sign cannot be a taking of a legal right. As
Vermont argued, this removal constituted a revocation of a license. 74
The same would be true in North Carolina. The enforcement of the
Outdoor Advertising Control Act does not take from the landowner a
legal right because the "right to be seen" only extends to
advertisements pertaining to on-site activities. Similarly, no legal
right exists and a restriction of this supposed "right to be seen" would
not fall within the strictures of the compensation requirement of
§ 131(g). This restriction is simply a "withdraw[al] of a favor."'175
Because there is no legal right in question, should North Carolina
choose to implement the suggested regulation, there would be no
taking of a legal right and therefore the federal government would
have no basis for withholding the highway funds. 6 The North
Carolina General Assembly can therefore redraft outdoor advertising
regulation to more effectively control billboards along public
highways without violating the federal or state constitutions, or the
federal Highway Beautification Act. Billboard regulation has been
found to be a legitimate state interest. Such regulation would not
violate the Takings Clause because there is no taking of a private
interest for public use, and therefore the regulation does not make a
legitimate interest economically useless. Similarly, there is no
violation of the Highway Beautification Act. Any current signs which
exceed their easement appurtenant rights were not lawfully erected in
the first place. The Outdoor Advertising Control Act did not alter
the common law regarding easements. A change in regulation from
173. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
174. See Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. at 613.
175. See Wilson, supra note 9, at 748.
176. This argument does not dispute the legitimacy of the Highway Beautification Act
for such a task would be well beyond the scope of this Comment. It is interesting to note
that much has been written about the constitutionality of the Act. For an excellent article
on the history of the Act and how requiring states to comply with the legislation at the risk
of losing valuable highway funds extends Congressional power beyond that permitted by
the Spending Clause or the Tenth Amendment, see Albert, supra note 10, at 463.
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the OACA would not be a taking of a legal fight, only the withdrawal
of a favor. Because North Carolina would not be removing lawfully
erected signs, effective control under the HBA would not require
compensation for their removal.
Although drafted to comply with the federal mandate and
combat the expanse of billboards on North Carolina's highways, the
effects of the Outdoor Advertising Control Act have been sparse-
especially since federal funding was cut in 1981.77 Clearly, the
current regulations are not fulfilling the stated purpose of the Act.
The General Assembly should revise the Act and abandon the
current regulatory structure, as it is based on an ineffective federal
mandate. The state legislature should extend the ban on new
billboard construction permanently, and redraft the current law
regarding existing structures so that removal efforts are more
effective, with the ultimate goal of eliminating all nonconforming
billboards along North Carolina highways. The state would be
justified in doing so under its fights as a landowner under the
common law of easements.
TIMOTHY J. FETE, JR.
177. See TEATER, supra note 8, at 26 ("With no more federal money on its way here,
the state discontinued its billboard removal program soon after the federal funding was
cut back.").
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